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INTERSTATE RIGHTS TO THE WATERS OF
THE CONNECTICUT RIVER: ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PROPOSED
NORTHFIELD .DIVERSION
CHARLES STEPHENSON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), an agency of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,1 is currently preparing an en
vironmental impact report on its proposed diversion of water from
the Connecticut River2 into the water supplies of Boston and forty
three other Massachusetts communities. 3 The proposal, generally
called the Northfield diversion, would employ the pumping capacity
of an existing hydroelectric power station to withdraw up to 375 mil
lion gallons of water daily from the river during periods of relatively
high fiow. 4 The water would be channeled from the power station
reservoir through an aqueduct to Quabbin Reservoir (Quabbin), the
• Clerk to Hon. Kent B. Smith, Massachusetts Appeals Court; Member of the
Massachusetts Bar; B.A., Brown University, 1972; M.A., Tufts University, 1973; J.D.,
Western New England College School of Law, 1982.
I. The MDC is an agency of the Commonwealth providing recreation, sanitation,
and water supply facilities to its member communities. The MDC was first organized as
a water supplier in 1895. Act of June 5, 1895, ch. 488, 1895 Mass. Acts 565.
2. The Connecticut River has its headwaters in the Connecticut Lakes of northern
New Hampshire; the river drains portions of four states (New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut) and Canada. The Connecticut River basin has an area
of 11,136 square miles, and the river is 280 miles in length.
3. Presently, the MDC water district includes 34 communities within 15 miles of
the State House in downtown Boston. Several central and western Massachusetts towns
also receive MDC water. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN
WATER SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet).
4. See Act of Aug. 25,1970, ch. 766,1970 Mass. Acts 631. The power station is the
Northfield Mountain plant operated by Northeast Utilities. The power plant and its op
erating procedures are discussed more fully at notes 23-38 infra and accompanying text.
See also Appendix A (diagram).
As originally approved, the diversion could only be accomplished when the flow of
the Connecticut River was greater than 15,000 cubic feet per second (cfs). Act of Oct. 13,
1967, ch. 669, 1967 Mass. Acts 565. The figure presently authorized is 17,000 cfs, as
measured at a United States Geological Survey monitoring station in Montague, Massa
chusetts. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 767, 1970 Mass. Acts 631. See Appendix B (map) and
notes 50-57 infra and accompanying text.
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MDC's major collection and storage facility.s
The Massachusetts legislature approved the Northfield diver
sion in principle during the late 1960's6 when, in the aftermath of a
sustained drought, the MDC's supply capability appeared to be im
periled. 7 At that time, there was little focused opposition to the
Northfield diversion or to a companion diversion project involving a
nearby Connecticut River tributary.s During the 1970's, however,
substantial opposition emerged. Criticism of the plan came from
sources as diverse as political leaders, environmental groups,9 and
municipal and state governments. 10 The opposition succeeded in de
laying the Northfield diversion and caused the Massachusetts legisla
ture to modify its approval to the extent that the plan is now termed
an alternative of last resort. I I
Despite the delays and criticism, the MDC has continued to
fund study of the plan and MDC officials remain confident that the
Northfield diversion eventually will be authorized and funded by the
5. The capacity of Quabbin Reservoir is 1,235,000 acre feet of water (an acre foot
is the volume of water required to flood an acre to the depth of one foot and is equivalent
to 325,851 gallons). METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN WATER
SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet).
6. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 767, 1970 Mass. Acts 631; Act of Oct. 13, 1967, ch. 669,
1967 Mass. Acts 565.
7. In 1970, Quabbin was filled to only 57 percent of capacity. SPECIAL STUDY
COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION RELATIVE TO PROVIDING FUNDS
FOR EXTENSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SOURCES AND DIVERSIONS
FROM THE CONNECTICUT RIVER TO QUABBIN RESERVOIR, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5543
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT).
8. The companion plan was to divert water from the Millers River in Erving, Mas
sachusetts. M. DeFalco, A History of the Proposed Northfield Diversion Project 10
(1979) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massa
chusetts). Although the plan has not been officially terminated, it has been given a low
priority by the MDC because of the poor quality of the Millers River water and because
the cost of accomplishing the diversion would be disproportionately high.
9. E.g., the Co~ecticut River Watershed Council, Inc., and Massachusetts Public
Interest Research Group (Mass PIRG). One citizen group, the Water Supply Citizens
Advisory Committee, has undertaken a significant role in the drafting of the environ
mental impact report on the diversion.
10. The following communities, for example, have all passed resolutions expres
sing opposition to the diversion, at least until all viable alternatives have been exhausted:
Springfield, Massachusetts, Apr. 22, 1975; Northampton, Massachusetts, Dec. 18, 1975;
Longmeadow, Massachusetts, Mar. 7, 1977; Hartford, Connecticut, Mar. 28, 1977; Mid
dletown, Connecticut, Apr. 7, 1977 (copies of the resolutions are available at the Con
necticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts).
II. Statement by Evelyn Murphy, Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Af
fairs (Aug. 5, 1977) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, East
hampton, Massachusetts). See also MASS. J. REs., Resolutions on Major Water Supply
Augmentation Projects (June 2, 1978).
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legislature. 12 Should that authorization be forthcoming, the State of
Connecticut likely will seek to enjoin the diversion. Connecticut's
largest water district also is contemplating a major diversion of the
Connecticut River to meet future supply requirements of greater
Hartford. 13 Moreover, the Connecticut General Assembly has in
structed the state attorney general to oppose any upstream diversions
that might harm any interests of Connecticut or its citizens.14
The Constitution grants the Supreme Court of the United States
original jurisdiction over controversies between the states. IS During
the twentieth century, the Court has apportioned water rights be
tween states in six river basins. 16 Significantly, one suit brought
before the Supreme Court was Connecticut v. Massachusetts,11 in
which Connecticut sought an injunction to block construction of
Quabbin and to prevent the MDC's diversion of a Connecticut River
tributary. IS The Supreme Court denied relief on the ground that
Connecticut had failed to prove the requisite injury to its interests,
but the Court left open to Connecticut the right to bring suit again
should its rights to jeopardized by future upstream diversions. 19
This comment will explore, in the context of a potential suit to
enjoin the Northfield diversion, the procedural, evidentiary, and le
12. Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, Apr. 1, 1980, at 7, col. 1. Officially, the MDC
also refers to the project as a last resort, but MDC administrators continue to regard the
Northfield diversion as a high priority.
13.
Based on our water demand projections, our present water supply
sources [surface reservoirs) will probably be fully utilized in about three de
cades, following which the in-stream or ground-water aquifer flows of the Con
necticut River or its tributaries will likely be the source of our future needs [sic).
Both quality and quantity of flow will affect the District's beneficial utiliza
tion of the Connecticut River.
Statement by Gilbert Gustafson, Manager, Metropolitan District Commission of Hart
ford (Jan. 10, 1972) (available at the Connecticut River Watershed Council library, East
hampton, Massachusetts).
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-126 (1969). Section 3-126 provides in its entirety:
The attorney general is authorized to investigate and, with the approval of
the governor, to take such action as is deemed necessary to protect the state
from damage by diversion or other interference with water from streams with
out the state which enter or are tributary to streams flowing within the state.
Any expenses incurred by the attorney general in instituting or maintaining
proceedings incident to such action shall be paid from the treasury on the ap
proval of the comptroller.
Id; See also CONN. SEN. J. RES. No. 33 (Apr. 22, 1979); CONN. SEN. J. REs. No.4 (Apr.
6, 1976).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
16. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
17. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
18. Id at 662.
19. Id at 674.
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gal principles involved in adjudication of an interstate water dispute.
Residents of southern New England will be directly affected by the
outcome ofthe Northfield controversy. But the potential conflict be
tween Connecticut and Massachusetts has broader implications as
well. In the absence of congressional apportionment of an interstate
stream,20 states with conflicting interests have only two avenues
available through which to achieve a permanent resolution of their
disagreement: Interstate compact21 and litigation. Both are burden
some, time-consuming, and costly.
Because natural resources, like the water of a flowing river, are
of finite capacity, one state's exploitation of an interstate resource
necessarily entails infringement upon the interests of another. In this
context, interstate agreements may be impossible and litigation inev
itable, at least when the infringement upon a state's interests is sub
stantial. Connecticut and Massachusetts may resolve their
differences over the Northfield diversion without resorting to litiga
tion, but similar disputes will arise as potential sources of water are
exhausted, while population and industrial growth increases de
mand. For that reason, although the Supreme Court has not been
active in apportioning water rights to interstate streams since 1945,22
suits between competing states may become more frequent in the
future.
II.

THE NORTHFIELD DIVERSION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACTS

The origins of the Northfield diversion can be traced to the en
gineering department of Northeast Utilities (NU), a holding com
20. The waters of the lower Colorado·River basin were apportioned by the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). The Supreme
Court sanctioned Congressional apportionment of the Colorado River in Arizona v. Cal
ifornia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Boulder Canyon legislation and Arizona v. California
have been the subject of extensive discussion. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 134
(R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as R. CLARK]'
21. An agreement between two states is not permitted by the Constitution of the
United States unless approved by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 1. The benefits
of interstate water use compacts are explored in Muys, Interstale Compacts and Regional
Water Resources Planning and Managemenl, 6 NAT. RES. LAW. 153 (1973); Stone, Inter
slale Water Compacts, 24 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 141 (1952).
22. Since the Supreme Court decided Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945),
there has been no judicial allocation of water rights between competing states. The
Supreme Court, during the last 35 years, has entertained several suits involving other
aspects of interstate water rights, and has amended several prior decrees. See, e.g., Ari
zona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Cases decided prior to 1945 are discussed at
notes 87-186 infra and accompanying text.
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pany for several southern New England power companies. 23 At the
suggestion of top executives ofWestern Massachusetts Electric Com
pany,24 an NU member utility, the engineers designing the North
field Mountain hydroelectric power station (Northfield) in Erving,
Massachusetts developed a site plan that would permit an economi
cally feasible diversion of Connecticut River water into nearby
Quabbin. 25 Because of favorable public response26 and legislative
action,27 NU incorporated the engineers' design for water diversion
capability into the Northfield Mountain project. 28 The Northfield
power station was constructed and, in 1973, began generating
electricity.
Northfield operates by siphoning Connecticut River water into
a tailrace and employing electrically driven pumps to direct that
water through a tunnel to a mountaintop holding reservoir.29 The
reservoir is approximately 800 feet above river level,30 so that when
the system's operation is reversed, water returns through the tunnel
23. N.U.'s member firms are The Connecticut Light and Power Company, The
Hartford Electric Light Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, Holyoke
Water Power Company, and Northeast Utilities Service Company.
24. See CONNECTICUT RIVER WATERSHED COUNCIL, INC., QUABBIN FACTS 17
(1967) [hereinafter cited as QUABBIN FACTS].
25. It can be argued that Northeast Utilities proposed the diversion as well as a
series of public parks in the Northfield Mountain area less as a matter of largesse than as
a political expedient, to enhance its bargaining posture as it sought licenses for construc
tion and operation.
26. A statement in a pamphlet printed by the Connecticut River Watershed Coun
cil is perhaps indicative of much of the public response:
Hailed by public officials and the press as the most dramatic water resource
development in Massachusetts in recent years is the Northeast Utilities proposal
to utilize the project's pumping facilities to provide 26 billion gallons annually
of excess Connecticut River water to Quabbin Reservoir during the period of
high freshet flow, primarily in the spring.
QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 15-16. The Watershed Council now has an entirely
new administration and has become a leading opponent of the diversion plan. See, e.g. ,
R. Hubley, Some Effects of the Proposed Diversion to Quabbin Through the Northfield
Pump and Storage Facility (Apr. 30, 1977) (available at the Connecticut River Water
shed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts).
27. See Act of Oct. 13, 1967, ch. 669, 1967 Mass. Acts 565; MASS. J. RES., ch. 46,
1967 Mass. Acts 888.
28. N.U. constructed its reservoir with dikes four feet higher than necessary to im
pound water for generating purposes, adding 375 million gallons of water storage capac
ity, and included in the wall of the reservoir the necessary headworks for the Quabbin
aqueduct. NORTHEAST UTILITIES, NORTHFIELD MOUNTAIN PuMPED STORAGE HYDRO
ELECTRIC PROJECT AND RECREATION AREAS 20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as N.U.,
NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET].
29. See Appendix A (diagram).
30. The elevation of the Connecticut River at Northfield Mountain is approxi
mately 180 feet above sea level. The mountain top reservoir has a maximum elevation of
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by force of gravity. The tunnel system directs the kinetic energy of
the falling water over turbines at the foot of the mountain, thereby
generating an average of one million kilowatts of electricity per
hour.3! From the turbines, the falling water is directed back into the
Connecticut River.32
The philosophy of Northfield's operation is to systematically ex
ploit fluctuations in wholesale electric rates, thereby minimizing
NU's overall cost of meeting demand for electrical energy.33 When
consumer demand is low, which is generally late at night, during
weekends, and on holidays, the wholesale price of electricity de
clines. 34 During those periods, Northfield purchases the electricity
necessary to pump water up to the storage reservoir. 35 Conversely,
when the wholesale price electricity commands is high, Northfield
releases stored water and generates electricity.36 The system is inge
nious, and permits NU to meet peak consumer demand with less
frequent reliance on electricity purchased from other suppliers. Ad
ditionally, any surplus energy generated at Northfield may be sold to
other utilities at elevated peak demand prices. Northfield carries an
other benefit: It generates electricity without the onsite use of nu
clear or fossil fuels. 37 Nonetheless, Northfield has a significant
impact on the Connecticut River, for although the plant imposes no
net loss on the river's flow, the periodic diversions and discharges of·
water create an unnatural rhythm of ebb and flood in the Northfield
reach of the river.38
approximately 1,000 feet above sea level. N.U., NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28,
at 5.
31. Id at 6.
32. Id
33. Id at 2.
34. Id
35. Id Two nuclear-fueled power facilities, in Vernon, Vermont and Rowe, Mas
sachusetts, are within twenty miles of the Northfield plant and provide a ready source of
off-peak su!,ply.
36. See id
37. N.U. appropriately notes that the electricity to power the Northfield Mountain
pumps comes from other steam and nuclear powered facilities. Id at 2. In effect, most
of the environmental burdens of the Northfield operation are felt elsewhere in New
England.
38. L. Brower & P. Walford, Model Zeta: Potential Effects of Diverting Connecti
cut River Flood Waters to Boston (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brower & Walford,
Model Zeta); P. Walford, The Yield of the Proposed Connecticut River Diversion (Sept.
1980) [hereinafter cited as Walford, Yield Study) (both available at the Connecticut
River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts). N.U. euphemistically
refers to its "lower reservoir" as having a length of twenty miles and a surface area of
2,000 acres. N.U., NOB.THAELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28, at 5. The "lower reservoir" is
in fact the main stem of the Connecticut River between two major dams. The studies by
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The MDC plan for diversion would utilize the existing pumping
and storage capacities of Northfield through the simple expedient of
connecting the mountaintop reservoir to Quabbin by aqueduct. 39
Because the elevation of Quabbin is 450 feet below the power station
reservoir,40 and because the aqueduct would be less than ten miles in
length,41 that segment of the diversion could be accomplished by
force of gravity. The aqueduct would terminate at the head of the
east branch of Quabbin.42 Connecticut River water would then min
gle with Quabbin water, and join the gradual flow of the east branch
toward the MDC intake at the southern end of the Quabbin. 43
Theoretically, the diversion would be limited only by the capac
ity of the pumps at Northfield, which can divert water from the river
at a staggering rate of 90,000 gallons per second. 44 As a practical
matter, however, the diversion would be limited by economic consid
erations. Northfield could be expected to pump some additional
water during periods oflow demand for electricity. Brief intervals of
additional pumping would not create any substantial interference
with the operation of the power station's generating cycle. 45 But unBrower and Walford focus on the possible impacts of periodic ebb and flood on river
ecology. Arguably, many of the impacts projected by the studies already occur as a by
product of the power station's present pumping regimen; presumably Brower and
Walford simply suggest those impacts would be exacerbated by a diversion.
39. QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 16-17. As presently envisioned, the
aqueduct would have an inside diameter of ten feet. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ADDENDUM:
NORTHFIELD MOUNTAIN WATER SUPPLY PROJECT NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES
WATER SUPPLY STUDY 6 (1974) (available from Corps of Engineers Regional Planning
Office, Waltham, Massachusetts) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF THE ARMY, NORTHFIELD
STUDY].
40. The maximum elevation of Quabbin Reservoir is 530 feet above mean low tide.
QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 10.
41. Estimates of the aqueduct's probable length vary from 8.5 to 9.8 miles. E.
KAYNOR, CONNECTICUT RIVER DIVERSION: A CASE STUDY IN WATER ALLOCATION
POLICY 46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY].
42. QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 16. See Appendix B (map). There also has
been some consideration given to building a longer aqueduct to the West Branch of
Quabbin, thus insuring that the MDC intake would be more fully buffered from the
lower quality Connecticut River water.
43. At present, the MDC's plan for pretreatment and purification of the water in
troduced into Quabbin is unclear. Williams, River Tapping: Would it Ruin our Drinking
Water?, Boston Globe, June 8, 1980, (Magazine), at 7 [hereinafter cited as Williams,
Boston Water].
44. N.U., NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28, at 5. The intake and discharge
processes use the same tunnels; the only separate facilities are the pumps and turbines
themselves. See Appendix A (diagram).
45. Northfield station operates on a flexible schedule, with most pumping occuring
during the night and on weekends. These periods would also be the times during which
pumping to facilitate the MDC diversion would occur. In fact, actual release of water to
the MDC could occur at any time that N.U. felt that water could be spared and the
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less the MDC were willing to pay more for water than that water's
value in power generation, no extra pumping would occur during
any but these brief slack periods.46 NU proposed 375 million gallons
per day (mgd) as a diversion volume acceptable to its interests.47
That figure is based on the reservoir's excess storage capacity48 and is
unrelated to the efficiency equation that would govern the daily di
version volume from Northfield. For that reason, in the absence of
legal limitations the figure could be readily modified by agreement
between NU and the MDC.49
Albeit through the use of very obscure language, the Massachu
setts legislature's 1970 authorization for Northfield apparently
adopted NU's suggested diversion volume of 375 mgd as a statutory
limit.50 With a nod toward the interests of Connecticut River basin
residents, the legislature also prohibited diversion "on any day when
the flow of water in the Connecticut river ... in the town of Monta
gue [several miles downstream of the power station] is less than sev
enteen thousand cubic feet per second [17,000 CfS]."51
storage reservoir had sufficient depth to permit release through the Quabbin aqueduct
headworks in the reservoir wall.
46. Presumably, in addition to the economic considerations that would limit diver
sion volume to that which could be pumped in a relatively short period of time, an addi
tional limitation would result from the technological requirements of time for
maintenance and flow reversal procedures. Furthermore, discharge through the turbines
can proceed at approximately 1.5 times the rate of pumping. N.V., NORTHFIELD PAM
PHLET, supra note 28, at 5. As a result, most of the available nighttime and weekend
hours are already used for the pumping necessary to maintain the sustained capacity to
release water and generate electricity during the weekday hours of peak demand.
47. Id at 20.
48. Id At the rate of 90,000 gallons per second, approximately 1.2 hours is re
quired to pump 375 million gallons.
49. The mountain top reservoir is regularly filled to capacity once a week at the
end of the sustained low-demand weekend period when pumping generally proceeds un
interrupted. As has been noted, diversion from the reservoir is not effectively limited by
the reservoir's capacity, the time of day, season of the year, or the rate of river flow. The
only effective limit, short of the technological capacity of the pumping system, is eco
nomic. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
50. The Act states: "The amount of water diverted over a three consecutive year
period shall not exceed three hundred and [sic) seventy-five million gallons per day for
each day that the flow of the Connecticut river . . . exceeds seventeen thousand cubic
feet per second." Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 766, 1970 Mass. Acts 631.
The language of the enactment may be fairly construed as authorizing diversion of
titanic proportions of water on any given date, as long as the three year gallonage (per
missible diversion days multiplied by 375 million gallons) is not exceeded. Professor
Walford noted this possibility, but rejected it as inconsistent with the legislature's appar
ent intent to maintain a reasonably stable stream flow in the Connecticut River.
Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 3.
51. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 766, 1970 Mass. Acts 631.
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Several interpretations of the 17,000 cfs limit are possible. 52 The
most logical construction is that no diversion would be permitted at
any time when the preceding twenty-four hours' average river flow
did not exceed 17,000 cfs. The average figure is appropriate because
even during periods of peak spring flow, the Connecticut River is
subject to large fluctuations in instantaneous flow, 53 caused by both
natural forces and the effects of periodic storage and discharge from
flood control and hydroelectric power facilities. 54 One study indi
cates that diversions authorized on the basis of the 17,000 cfs-aver
age calculation could occur on ninety-one days in a typical year. 55
Under that regimen, the Northfield diversion would theoretically en
hance MDC supplies by an average of ninety-nine mgd,56 and would
deplete the yearly flow of the river by thirty-four billion gallons.
The MDC, from an unclear statistical basis, has projected seventy
diversions per year, an average yield of seventy-two mgd, and a
yearly river depletion of twenty-six billion gallons. 57
External forces, especially regional weather patterns, suggest
that no projection is absolutely reliable in predicting the actual func
tion of the proposed diversion. As recently as the spring of 1980,
Quabbin was filled to capacity and overflowing its spillway. 58 Pre
dictably, the spring months are also when the Connecticut River
peaks and its average flow most frequently exceeds 17,000 cfs at
Montague. 59 In many years, then, the Northfield diversion might
52. See Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 3-6.
53. Instantaneous flow is the rate of stream flow at any given moment. Instantane
ous flow can be monitored at any regular interval. The Montague gauge records flow
bihourly. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38.
54. Nearby hydropower facilities are the Turners Falls Dam, Vernon Dam (Ver
mont), and the Northfield Mountain station. In his first study, Walford suggested that
the appropriate construction of the Act, see note 50 supra, would be that diversion would
only be permissible when flow exceeded 17,000 cfs at every monitoring interval during
the preceding 24 hours. Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 4. This interpretation
seems unlikely given the history of the diversion proposal (the legislature had authorized
diversion whenever the river flow exceeded 15,000 cfs) and the apparent intent of the
legislature. Walford's strict construction would also have the probable effect of blocking
diversion on any two consecutive days when the river was at any stage less than a raging
flood, because the effect of one day's diversion could possibly cause a fluctuation below
17,000 cfs at the downstream monitoring station. It seems unlikely th~e legislature in
tended such a result. Walford subsequently adopted the average-flow interpretation in
his second study. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38.
55. Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 5.
56. The computation is: Permissible diversion days (91) multiplied by the prob
able daily yield (375 mgd) divided by the number of days in a year (365).
57. See KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 58.
58. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7,11 (photograph).
59. See Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at figure 2. During the past 75 years,
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prove to be impractical during the season in which it could be ex
pected to operate most safely and efficiently,60 simply because the
MDC would not have storage capacity for additional supplies. 61
Conversely, during periods of drought, when the MDC's need
would be greatest, the volume of river flow would be restricted and
would less frequently exceed the 17,000 cfs flow requirement. Any
diversions that might be accomplished during such periods of scar
city would have more significant downstream impacts62 and would
cause introduction of relatively poor quality water into the MDC
system.63
The vagueness of the enabling legislation, the inconsistent di
version projections, and the imponderables of future demand and
weather conditions make difficult an accurate projection of the
Northfield diversion's impacts. Given the complexities involved,
even the comprehensive Environmental Impact Report64 will be
speculative in its projections. Apparently, some impacts would be
substantial while others would be less so; any impact, of course,
would vary in its harshness depending on the volume of diversion
and the rate of river flow. For purposes of clarity, the likely impacts
of diversion are presented in tabular form. Those impacts poten
tially significant to interstate litigation will be discussed more fully in
a subsequent section.

the months of April and May have supplied over 50 percent of the days upon which
diversion would be permissible under the present statutory formula. Id
60. Spring Bood waters, per cubic foot, can be expected to carry lesser burdens of
sewage and other organic contaminants than do waters Bowing at a more restrained vol
ume and pace. Thus, water introduced into Quabbin would be purer during the spring.
Similarly, a diversion of 375 mgd. were the river Bowing at 30,000 cfs, would likely have
only a fraction of the downstream impact of a similar diversion accomplished were the
river Bowing at 17,000 cfs.
61. On the other hand, when the spring freshet follows a dry year, or if MDC
member community demand increases substantially, Quabbin will not be full during the
spring or any other season.
62. See note 60 supra; see also TABLES I-III infra and accompanying notes.
63. The amount of pollution discharged into the river is relatively constant
throughout the year. Only Bow varies markedly; thus, during periods of low rate of flow,
much higher concentrations of pollutants would be present in a given volume of water.
If the quality of water in the Connecticut River were sufficiently poor, the MDC could be
expected to forego an otherwise permissible diversion.
64. The Environmental Impact Report will be the product of research by several
consulting firms and a citizens advisory group. As of this writing, the report remains in
its early stages of preparation.
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I.

Impacts Resulting From Restriction

Impact

Effect

651

of River Flow

Impacted Populations
and Activities

Reduced flood
cleansing

Increase in riverbed
sludge a

Fisheries b
Recreation c
Water Supply

Increased salinity in
estuary

Alteration of
estuarine habitat"

Riverbed mussels e
Water supply

Reduced inundation
of floodplain

Alteration of
floodplain habitat/"

Riverbed lifee
Floodplain vegetation
Agriculture h

Reduced flow during
an average of
ninety days per
year

Increase in river
water temperature,
enhancing organic
contamination i

Fisheries
Recreation
Waste disposal
Water supply

Decrease in available
suspended oxygen,
.enhancing organic
contamination j

Fisheries
Recreation
Waste disposal
,Water supply

Decrease in available
flow k

Water supply
Hydroelectric power
generation
Waste disposal
Fisheries
Recreation
Navigation

a

b

c
d

Without strong flood currents to periodically flush the river and to scour the riverbed
of accumulated sludge, sludge buildup will increase with the probable effect of
reducing oxygen levels in the river and increasing water temperatures, thereby creat
ing reverberations throughout the riverine food chain. See CONNECTICUT BASIN
CO-ORDINATING COMM. COMPREHENSIVE WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES
INVESTIGATION, D-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE
INVESTIGATION].
"Fisheries" connotes impact on commercial fisheries.
"Recreation" connotes impact on sport fishing, boating, swimming, and related
shoreline activities.
The primary effect of reduced flow on the Connecticut River estuary would be to
move upstream the point at which river water is entirely fresh, and to cause, down
stream of that point, an adjustment in the fresh to salt water gradient. At any given
point below the furthest upstream influence of salt water, the river would be saltier
than it would be were it not for the diversion. It is not clear whether the proposed
Northfield diversion would have any perceptible effect on the estuary, which by the
nature of tidal action, is a dynamic and changing zone under any circumstance.
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One study prepared for the Northfield Citizens Advisory Committee suggests a
diversion might threaten an estuarine mussel, Alasmidonta heterodon. D. Smith,
Report to Northfield Citizens Comm. (NCAC) (available at Connecticut River
Watershed Council.library, Easthampton, Massachusetts).
[P)ointbar and ox-bow lake formation, rejuvenation of coarse streambed
breeding habitats, and the maintenance of the unique floodplain forests,
swamps and marshes, depend on the extreme of flooding. Due to the very
flat topography of the floodplain, a vertical change of very small magnitude
in the level of flooding can make a much greater change in the area flooded.
Even an inch (measured vertically), extended over the whole area of the
floodplain, may reduce the area of inundation by hundreds of acres.
R. Hubley, supra note 26.
A slug, Cragonex pseudogracilis, whose breeding habitat is in floodplain backwaters,
might be destroyed by any substantial alteration in annual floodplain inundation. D.
Smith, supra note e.
The Connecticut valley has historically been an extremely fertile agricultural area,
largely because of the alluvial deposits left by the Connecticut River. In recent years,
valley agriculture has become largely dependent on the use of chemical fertilizers,
and, because of flood control damming, little tillable land has been inundated in
recent decades.
Reduced flow increases the concentration of organic contaminants in any stream. In
the absence of sufficient oxygen, organic compounds decay anaerobically, generating
both heat and odor. See BASIN COMM., COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION supra note
a, at D-71.
.
As flow decreases and organic contaminants become more concentrated, available
oxygen supplies are depleted, anaerobic decomposition occurs, and water quality
decreases. fd. Decreased flow also lowers the turbulence of a stream, inhibiting its
capacity to capture airborne oxygen. fd.
It has been suggested that the Northfield diversion, operating at the levels predicted
by the MDC, would subtract only one percent of the Connecticut River's annual
average flow. But it can be shown that reduced flow, reduced levels of oxygen,
increased waste load, and increased anaerobic decomposition all are closely interre
lated, and that disruption of the balance of these forces can substantially affect the
quality of water in a stream. See notes a, i-j supra.
TABLE

II. Impacts Resulting From Cyclical Rapid Reductions
In River Flow

Impact
Increased turbulence
and possible
reverse river flow'

I

m
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Effect

Impacted Populations
and Activities

Riverbed-floodplain
erosion and
increased water
turbiditym

Recreation
Fisheries
Navigation

Disruption of sensory
orientation and
spawning activity
of sport and
commercial fish n

Fisheries
Recreation

The discussion of ebb and flood impacts is based on the computer projections gener
ated in the Model Zeta study, Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38.
Periodic rapid reductions in natural flow which "would occur during flood periods
when the kinetic energy of the river is high, [might result in] erratic erosion patterns

INTERSTATE WATER RIGHTS

1982]

n

653

. particularly along the banks of the river." Id. Erosion and erratic patterns of
flow would also probably increase the level of solids suspended in, and later precipi
tating from, the waters of the Connecticut River.
Brower and Walford also speculate that an unnatural ebb and flood cycle on an
upstream reach of the river could seriously impair the direction-sensing processes of
certain fish, most notably the shad and Atlantic salmon. fd.
TABLE

III.

Impacts Resulting From Introductions
Connecticut River Water Into
Quabbin Reservoir

Impact

Effect

0/

Impacted Populations
and Activities

Introduction of river
species into
Quabbin

Disruption of reser
voir ecologyo

Recreation
Water supply

Introduction of
impure water in
Quabbin

Reduction in reser
voir water qualityp

Water supply

Increase in lake bed
silting at mouth of
aqueduct

Water supply

Possibly radioactive
contamination of
MDe water
supply'!

Water supply

o

P

q

Quabbin Reservoir is renowned for excellent trout fishing. METROPOLITAN DIS
TRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN WATER SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet). The sea
lamprey, a parasitic eel-like fish, could enter Quabbin from its present habitat in the
Connecticut River and rapidly throw the reservoir's carefully developed and delicate
ecosystem into chaos by depleting the trout population. See Williams, Boston Water,
supra note 43, at 7, 9. Another potential pest in the reservoir is the carp, which stirs
up bottom sediments, causing turbidity and the destruction of fish eggs. T. CONVEL,
QUABBIN: THE ACCIDENTAL WILDERNESS 57 (1981).
Quabbin water is rated class A+, the highest purity classification. The Connecticut
River is rated class C+, Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7, and carries high
levels of organic contaminants from upstream sewage disposal and wood pulp
processing. Water quality ratings in the New England states are based on a scale of
class A to class D, class A being suitable for any use, class D being suitable only for
navigation and some industrial uses. Ratings for the Connecticut River are based on
an analysis of the following factors: level of dissolved oxygen, burden of sludge,
color, turbidity, taste, odor, pH, coliform bacteria contamination, radioactivity, and
levels of phosphates, ammonia, and phenols. BASIN COMM., COMPREHENSIVE
INVESTIGATION, supra TABLE I, note a, at D-75 to 76.
The Vermont Yankee power plant, nine miles north of the Northfield Mountain
intake point, has had a checkered career as a nuclear facility. Its troubled history
includes several incidents of radioactive discharge into the Connecticut River. Wil
liams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 9. Predictably, scientists and engineers have
widely varying opinions concerning the risks of significant radioactive contamination
of the MDC supply, but most concur that there is some danger. Id.
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INTERSTATE WATER DIVERSION LITIGATION

Under the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction,65 the
Supreme Court has entertained six major lawsuits brought by down
stream states requesting relief from upstream diversions. 66 In four of
those cases the Supreme Court issued decrees apportioning rights to
water from interstate streams;67 in the others, the Court placed no
restrictions on the challenged diversions. 68 The cases are few and
propound no firmly settled body of law that could be invoked to
resolve an interstate suit joined over the Northfield diversion. 69 The
cases, however, do illustrate the broad principles of evidence and
legal analysis that should govern future interstate water rights
litigation.
A recurrent theme in the cases is the problem of choice of law:
Whether intrastate law, considerations of equity, or elements of both
should govern the Supreme Court's decisions. Each of the fifty states
has developed its own unique body of law apportioning rights to
flowing water among competing users;70 thus, from the outset, the
Court has rejected application of purely intrastate law.7l The Court,
65. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. I & 2.
66. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (apportioning the North Platte
River); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) (declining to apportion the Walla
Walla River); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (apportioning the Delaware
River); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (apportioning the Connecticut
River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (apportioning the Laramie River);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (declining to apportion the Arkansas River). The
Supreme Court has also decided one case brought by several Great Lakes states to pro
test a diversion from Lake Michigan. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
Two other decisions considered diversions info interstate rivers. See North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
67. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419 (1922).
68. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
69. The Supreme Court has recurrently used two shorthand phrases to characterize
the principles it has applied: "[E]quality of right," Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97
(1907) and "equitable apportionment," Id at 118. See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589,617 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922). The principle of equitable apportionment is ex
plored in 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 132.1.
70. See I R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 51.
71. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). The Court said, "[s]itting, as it
were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law,
and intemationallaw, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand. . . ." Id at
146-47. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). "[T]hrough these succes
sive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly
be called interstate common law." Id
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however, has accorded weight to general principles of water law
shared by competing states. 72
The two major doctrines of water law are rip arianism, common
to the eastern and Mississippi Valley states, and priority of appropri
ation, common to the western states. 73 Riparianism, a common law
principle, historically gave downstream abutters rights to the undis
turbed natural flow of a stream. 74 Common law riparianism is now
subject to numerous exceptions, including a rule common to most
riparian states that upstream abutters are entitled to a reasonable use
of a stream's flow for normal consumption and waste discharge. 75
But even under the modem doctrine of riparianism, rights to reason
able use are limited to landowners abutting a body of water, so that
distant consumers are restricted in their right to divert water from a
stream. 76
In the western states, the doctrine of priority of appropriation
developed as better suited to encouraging the large-scale irrigation
and storage of spring runoff necessary for effective agricultural de
velopment of arid land. 77 By contrast to riparianism, priority of ap
propriation attaches no significance to a user's proximity to a
watercourse. Ownership of land abutting a stream carries no special
rights of access to streamflow; a distant consumer is in theory enti
tled to as much water as he can put to beneficial use. 78 The gov
erning rule of appropriation law is priority in time: During periods
of water shortage, more recent (junior) appropriators must curtail,
or, if necessary, cease their use of a stream so that prior (senior) ap
propriators' demands can be satisfied. 79
The Supreme Court, in the interstate water diversion cases, has
developed another principle of water rights to govern disputes be
tween competing states: Equitable apportionment. 8o Equitable ap
portionment "is a label, not an analysis,"81 but functionally, it is a
72. See notes 168-86 infra and accompanying text.
73. For a more complete definition of the two doctrines see J. SAX, WATER LAW,
PLANNING & POLICY 1-3 (1968). The importance of the doctrines in interstate water
rights litigation is discussed in 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20, §§ 131.3 -.4.
74. See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 21, §§ 17.1, 51.2.
75. Reasonable use is discussed in 7 id, § 611. See a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (1977).
76. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87
(1913).
77. See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 18.
78. See id,§§ 51.5 -.9.
79. See id, § 51.9.
80. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
81. R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 132.1.
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judgment based on "a consideration of the pertinent laws of the con
tending States and all other relevant facts . . . ."82 Equitable appor
tionment softens the harsh consequences of both riparian and
appropriation doctrine, which, if applied to interstate disputes,
. would have the effect of vesting absolute rights in certain states. 83
Approached chronologically, the Supreme Court decisions show
a marked evolution in the Court's approach toward interstate water
disputes and its willingness to rely on principles of intrastate water
law. The early cases, couched in sweeping language, established the
rule of equitable apportionment and alternately accepted or rejected
state law principles in an inconsistent pattern. 84 The later decisions
gave fuller content to the term equitable· apportionment, and the
Court engaged in a more sophisticated examination of the benefits
and burdens resulting from large-scale diversions and of the expecta
tions, born of state law, of the competing consumers.85 The Court
drafted increasingly complex decrees of apportionment in an effort
to fairly balance those considerations. 86 The body of law that
emerged may be settled in its general framework but, as a rule of
equity, is ad hoc in its application, wholly dependent upon the quali
ty of the evidence adduced in any given controversy.
Kansas was the first state to sue another over rights to the con
sumption of the waters of an interstate stream. In 1901, Kansas
brought suit against Colorado, alleging that Colorado was diverting
an excessive volume of water from the Arkansas River.87 In Kansas
v. Colorado,88 Chief Justice Fuller traced the Court's role in inter
state dispute resolution and determined that water rights controver
sies were a proper matter for the Court's original jurisdiction. 89 A
82. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 670-71 (1931).
83. If, for instance, a strict common law riparian rule were applied, an upstream
state would be effectively foreclosed from any significant diversions of water unless water
of equal quantity and quality were returned to the stream. Similarly, as between compet
ing appropriation states, strict application of appropriation law would give the state that
first exploited a stream rights superior to a more recently developing state, without regard
for equity or the regional implications of such an allocation.
84. Compare Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) with Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419 (1922).
.
85. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
86. See, e.g., id at 665-72 (decree); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931).
87. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 132-39 (1902).
88. 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
89. Id at 139-47. Article III of the Constitution of the United States grants the
federal judiciary jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies between two or more states; ..." and
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demurrer by Colorado was overruled. 90
After a lengthy period of factfinding by a Court appointed
master,91 the merits of Kansas' claim were reached in 1907.92 In an
opinion by Justice Brewer, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was re
confirmed, and the immense volume of evidence presented93 was
condensed into several general findings: That the diversions prac
ticed by Colorado irrigators had diminished the flow of the Arkansas
River;94 that the Arkansas River region in Colorado was entirely de
pendent on irrigation;95 that the Kansas counties bordering the river
had recently lost population,96 and; that the crop yield in Kansas had
not been clearly diminished because of upstream diversions. 97
Canvassing prior decisions on water rights, Justice Brewer con
cluded that the Supreme Court's judgment was not bound by either
state's internal rules of water law,98 but, rather, was governed by
provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases to which a
state is a party. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. I & 2. The United States Judicial Code is
more explicit, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in "[a)ll controversies
between two or more states. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
Since a demurrer was overruled in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), there
has been no serious dispute about the propriety of litigating interstate water controversies
before the Supreme Court. The principles of original jurisdiction are discussed in Note,
The Original Jur.isdiction of tlte United Slates Supreme Court, II STAN. L. REv. 665
(1959).
90. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. at 147.
91. The Supreme Court has appointed a master in each of the interstate water
rights cases. The master's responsibilities include collecting evidence, presiding over
hearings, taking expert testimony, and reporting his or her findings to the Court. See
FED. R. CIY. P. 53.
92. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas y. Colorado is discussed in
Friedrich, The Settlement of Disputes Between States Concerning Rights to tlte Waters of
Interstate Streams, 32 IOWA L. REv. 244 (1947).
93. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 105 (1907). Justice Brewer noted both the
volume of evidence (8,559 pages, 122 exhibits, 347 witnesses) and its apparent unreliabil
ity: "[T)here is no little contradiction and a good deal of confusion [in the evi
dence). . . ." Id at 105-06.
94. Id at 106-08, 117.
95. Id at 109-10, 117. Justice Brewer observed that many of the Colorado diver
sions had been undertaken over ten years before Kansas first brought suit. Id at 107-08.
There was no suggestion in his opinion that the principle of laches should be invoked
against the Kansas claim, although the Court was very solicitous of the needs of the
Colorado irrigators who had become dependent on the diversions. "[The irrigators had)
transform[ed) thousands of acres into fertile fields and render[ed) possible their occupa
tion and cultivation where otherwise they would have continued barren and unoccu
pied. . . ." Id at 117. See note 127 infra.
96. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 110, 112-13.
97. Id at Ill, 113.
98. Id at 98-105. Justice Brewer noted that Colorado was governed by the rule of
prior appropriation while Kansas applied the eastern riparian rule. He neatly under
mined Kansas' argument that the Court should apply strict riparian principles of unabat
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rules of equity and a balancing of the interests of the competing
states. 99 Justice Brewer interpreted the evidence as demonstrating
that while great benefits accrued to Colorado through irrigation, the
diversions by which that irrigation was accomplished had worked
only minimal injury on Kansas,loo and held that no relief should be
granted. 101 Justice Brewer characterized the then existing division of
Arkansas River waters as an "equitable apportionment of bene
fits"I02 among the two states, despite some evidence that the riverbed
in Kansas had been on occasion left dry.103
Disputes between rival water users in the two states continued
long after 1907, and in 1943, the Court again adjudicated the con
flicting claims of Kansas and Colorado in Colorado v. Kansas .104
The Court found that the flow of the Arkansas had actually in
creased during the years intervening since its prior decision,105 and
that while the State of Colorado and private Colorado users had in
stituted sensible conservation procedures, Kansas users were using
primitive techniques and making inefficient use of the flow of water
available to them. 106 Again, no discernible injury to the interests of
Kansas or its citizens had been proven. 107 Again, no substantive re
strictions were placed on Colorado's use of the river. lOS

ed flow by citing Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905), which had adopted a
test of reasonableness in adjudicating riparian rights within Kansas. Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. at 102-03.
99. See note 71 supra.
100. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 109-113, 1I7.
101. Idatl17.
102. Id at 1I8. Kansas was granted the right to again bring suit should the vol
ume of diversions "material[lyJ increase." Id
103. Id at lIS.
104. 320 U.S. 383 (1943). Colorado had complained that a series oflawsuits filed
by Kansas water users were disrupting Colorado's distribution planning, and that adjudi
cation of the suits would result in a fixed interstate allocation system. Colorado argued
such a result was in contravention of the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Colo
rado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas in tum counterclaimed that Colorado had authorized
diversions in excess of those approved by the earlier case. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S.
at 386-88 (1943). The 1943 decision is discussed in 44 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1944).
105. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 396-98 (1943).
106. Id at 397. The principle of discouraging waste is central to water law, and
could be a critical factor in any litigation over the proposed Northfield diversion. See
notes 252-59 infra and accompanying text.
107. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 400 (1943).
108. Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944) (decree). The individual Kansas
water users were enjoined from further prosecuting their claims. Id The Court, possibly
tiring of this conflict, had been blunt in advising states facing similar disputes in the
future to attempt reaching agreement under the Compact Clause, rather than invoking
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392 (1943).
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In 1922, the Supreme Court, in Wyoming v. Colorado, 109 entered

its first decree I 10 apportioning the waters of an interstate river. Wyo
ming brought suit to enjoin a Colorado irrigation project that would
have removed a significant portion of the Laramie River's flow to
irrigate lands outside the river's watershed.l l l Wyoming's first
ground for objection, that no out of basin diversion from an inter
state river should be permitted, was summarily dismissed as an in
sufficient basis for the grant of an injunction. ll2 Similarly rejected
was Colorado's contention that it should be permitted to consume all
the river water regardless of any injury to the interests of a down
stream state. 113 Noting that both states recognized the doctrine of
priority of appropriation,114 Justice Van Devanter held that the prin
ciple of priority, applied without regard for state lines, was the most
equitable basis for apportioning the wat~rs of the Laramie River. I IS
Justice Van Devanter then determined the dependable flow of the
Laramie River l16 and ordered the priorities of the competing appro
priators in both states.ll7 Because the volume of the appropriations
recognized by both states exceeded the dependable flOW,118 the
Court's decree enjoined Colorado from permitting a planned diver
sion by the most junior appropriator in that state from exceeding a
fixed annual volume.l l9
The decree proved ineffective in circumscribing the conduct of
Colorado and its appropriators, and Wyoming continued to press its
c1aims.l 20 In 1936, the Court held that certain appropriations in Col
259 u.s. 419 (1922). Wyoming v. Colorado is discussed in Bannister, Interstate
Interstate Streams in the Aritl West, 36 HARV. L. REv. 960 (1923).
259 U.S. at 496 (1922) (decree).
Id at 456.
112. Id at 466-67. The Court's opinion noted that similar diversions were permit
ted under the laws of both states. Id
113. Id at 466. Such a rule would be totally alien to the rules of equitable appor
tionment laid down in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), and in several other
Supreme Court decisions. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 466.
114. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 467, 470-71. See notes 73-76 supra and
accompanying text.
liS. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 470.
116. Id at 471-89.
117. Id at 489-95.
118. Id at 489.
119. Id at 496. The decree was modified shortly thereafter. Wyoming v. Colo
rado, 260 U.S. I (1922). The limits placed by the decree on the most junior appropriator
is entirely consistent with the rules of prior appropriation. See notes 73-79 supra and
accompanying text.
120. The individual appropriators were explicitly held bound by an interim decree,
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932).
109.
Rights in
110.
111.
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orado should be terminated. 121 Otherwise, Colorado was free to
vary the volume of diversions allocated to individual appropria
tors,122 as long as the aggregate limits imposed by the earlier decree
were observed.123 Evidently, despite its references to individual ap
propriators, the prior decision had not been intended to fix the rights
of the individual appropriators, but only to establish their priorities
as a tool in fairly apportioning the Laramie River among the com
peting states. 124 Rules of priority, on the facts of Wyoming v. Colo
rado,12S simply had provided a convenient formula to apply in
attaining that goal. 126
The Supreme Court in 1931 first addressed the problems of ap
portioning water rights to interstate rivers among contending ripa
rian states. 127 In ConnectiCut v. Massachusetts l28 and New Jersey v.
121. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 579, 581-82, 586 (1936). Justice Van
Devanter found that Colorado had excusably violated several unclear provisions of the
earlier decree, and because Colorado had promised to abide by any clarification of its
rights, no injunction was issued to correct those violations. Id at 579. Another diversion
that had be.en carried on beyond the limitations placed by the decree, with "distinctly
wasteful" results, was placed under a specific injunction. Id at 581-82, 586. This second
major opinion in the Laramie River controversy is discussed in Simsarian, The Diversion
of Inlerslale Walers in Ihe Uniled Slales, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 907 (1938).
122. The appropriators were those recognized in the 1922 decision. See note 119
supra and accompanying text.
123. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1936).
124. Id at 583-85. Justice Van Devanter found that the rights of individual appro
priators were governed by state law and not properly before the Court:
It was not the purpose of that suit or of the decree to withdraw water clainIs
dealt with therein from the operation of local laws relating to their transfer or to
restrict their utilization in ways not affecting the rights of one state and her
claimants as against the other state and her claimants.
Id at 584.
125. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
126. Justice Van Devanter's opinion noted that appropriation law, in addition to
providing a fair basis for the decision, placed mutual responsibilities on both states to
make fair and reasonable use of the Laramie River. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at
484. The 1936 decision was further clarified in Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572
(1940) and amended by consent of both states in Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953
(1957).
127. In 1929, the Supreme Court had adjudicated another major water dispute in
Wisconsin v.lllinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), which focused on the rights ofstates bordering
on the Great Lakes. Wisconsin, together with Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New
York, had brought suit to have the Court enjoin the novel waste disposal practices of
Chicago, hinging on the diversion of huge volumes of water from Lake Michigan into the
Mississippi River system. By the early 1920's that diversion had caused the level of the
lower Great Lakes to decrease by six inches. The states opposing the diversion succeeded
in obtaining a decree which imposed major, step-by-step reductions in the volume of
water Chicago was permitted to siphon from Lake Michigan. Id at 420. Wisconsin v.
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New York,129 the Court permitted major diversions from tributaries

of the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers.
Connecticut v. Massachusetts 130 grew out of the expanding water
supply requirements of Boston and, as would any litigation over the
proposed Northfield diversion, pitted the interests of the Connecticut
Valley against those of eastern Massachusetts. As the Boston metro
politan area grew in the early twentieth century, water demand rap
idly overtaxed the supply available from the MDC's existing
sources. l3l By 1927, the Massachusetts General Court had settled on
the construction of Quabbin to relieve the supply crisis, and the nec
essary legislation was enacted.132 In 1928, Connecticut filed suit, al
leging that the Quabbin plan would violate Connecticut's riparian
rights in the Connecticut River in several respects. 133 Connecticut
sought an injunction forbidding the impoundment of the Swift River
and diversions to Quabbin from the Ware River}34 Both rivers are
tributaries of the Connecticut.
After a period of factfinding, the Supreme Court ruled on the
merits of Connecticut's claim, denying requests for injunctions
against both the Quabbin plan and any future diversions. 13S Con
necticut had attempted to prove injury to its shad fishery, hydroelecIllinois has substantial importance in the related field of interstate river rights litigation,
for the case demonstrates the significance the Court may attach to objectively proven
harm. The Supreme Court was clearly impressed by the substantial long term damage to
Great Lakes shipping interests. Id at 408-09. Collecting such evidence, which is the
product of observing the effect of an accomplished diversion, is not without its draw
backs. As was noted in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Supreme Court
showed great solicitude for the reliance a region may come to place on an accomplished
diversion. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
128. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). Connecticut v. Massachusetts is discussed in Kelly, Ra

tioning the Rivers: A Decade ofInterstate Waters and Interstate Commerce in the Supreme
Court, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 12 (1941); Burch, Conflicling Inlerests ofSlales over Inter
slale Walers, 10 TENN. L. REv. 267 (1932).
129. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). New Jersey v. New York is discussed in Simsarian, The
Diversion of Interslale Waters in the Uniled Slates, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 907 (1938);
Burch, Conflicting Interests of States over Inlerstate Waters, 10 TENN. L. REv. 267 (1932)

(Judge Burch was the Master who had collected evidence and made recommendations to
the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. New York).
130. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
131. Id at 664-65.
132. See Act of April 26, 1927, ch. 321, 1927 Mass. Acts 384; Act of May 28,1926,
ch. 375,1926 Mass. Acts 441. As constructed, Quabbin Reservoir flooded approximately
39 square miles of the Swift River basin and wiped out four Massachusetts towns: Pres
cott, Dana, Enfield, and Greenwich. Approximately 2,500 people were resettled. QUAB
BIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 3, 10-11.
133. 282 U.S. at 662-63.
134. Id at 662, 665-66.
135. Id at 673-74.

662

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:641

tric power facilities, floodplains, and to the navigability of the
river.136 Connecticut also argued a classical riparian right to an una
bated flow of the river.137 Justice Butler found the evidence
presented unpersuasive,138 and held that earlier cases compelled a
complaining state to prove that "the threatened invasion of rights is
of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing evi
dence,"139 a burden he found Connecticut had not met. 140 Similarly,
Justice Butler rejected any suggestion that an out-of-basin diversion
was inherently objectionable,141 as it would be under pure riparian
ism.142 Justice Butler refused to allow other elements of riparianism
to govern the Supreme Court's reasoning. 143 Rather, he held that
given Boston's need for a dependable source of drinking water, the
absence of any proven alternative sources, and the inadequacy of
Connecticut's proof of injury, no injunction should be issued. 144 Sig
nificantly, however, the Court's final decree l45 placed an affirmative
obligation on Massachusetts to abide by limits placed on the opera
tion of Quabbin,146 and granted Connecticut the right to renew its
objections if its "substantial interests" were threatened by violation
of those limits through a "material increase" 147 in the Massachusetts
diversions from the Ware and Swift Rivers. 148

136. Id. at 666-67.
137. Id. at 669-70.
138. Id. at 666-67, 672-73.
139. Id. at 669. Justice Butler cited New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. at 309 and
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906). Both those cases pertained to claims of
nuisance arising from the sewage disposal practices of the defendant states, rather than
the disruption of an interstate river's flow caused by a diversion. Justice Holmes had
defended the imposition of these burdens in interstate litigation in Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.~. 496, 519-11 (1906).
140. 282 U.S. at 669.
141. Id. at 672.
142. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
143. 282 U.S. at 670-72. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
144. 282 U.S. at 672-74. Justice Butler said, "Drinking and other domestic pur
poses are the highest uses of water." Id. at 673.
145. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931) (decree).
146. The limits were incorporated from Massachusetts legislation and an agree
ment between Massachusetts and the Army Corps of Engineers. See Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 665, 672, 674.
147. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789, 790 (1931).
148. Neither the Swift nor Ware Rivers enter Connecticut before discharging into
the main stem of the Connecticut River, thus Connecticut has never had any legally
cognizable interest in the flow of either river except as each contributes to the flow of the
main stem. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936), the Supreme Court made
clear that it did not intend that its decree be read as circumscribing the internal w&ter
allocation rules of the party states. See note 126 supra. Thus, the decree in Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931), which limited the diversion volume from two in
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A resolution similar to that in Connecticut v. Massachusetts 149
was reached by Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York. lso New
Jersey alleged that a New York plan to impound and divert to New
York City the waters of several Delaware River tributaries would
violate New Jersey's general riparian rights and cause certain spe
cific injuries. lsl In line with the rule stated in Connecticut v. Massa
chusetts,IS2 Justice Holmes rejected application of strict riparianism,
stating:
[A] more liberal answer may be given [in resolving interstate
disputes] than in a controversy between neighbors members of a
single State. Different considerations come in when we are deal
ing with independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of
the whole population and when the alternative to settlement is
war. In a less[er] degree, perhaps, the same is true of the quasi
sovereignties bound together in the Union. A river is more than an
amenity, it is a treasure. It ojJers a necessity of life that must be
rationed among those who have power over it. . . . Both States
have real and substantial interests in the River that must be recon
ciled as best they may be. The different traditions and practices in
different parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the
effort is always to secure an equitable apportionment without qUib
bling over formulas [SiC].IS3

Although Justice Holmes cited no evidence to support such a
conclusion, New Jersey's allegations that the diversion would impair
recreation and oystering in the river were deemed proven. IS4 The
decree lss therefore placed a ceiling, well below that requested by
Iraslate rivers, may be read as a limit on Massachusetts' right to divert from the main
stem or any tributary, if the combined effect of that and the existing Quabbin diversion
would cause an injury to Connecticut's interests. The Court implicitly made this sugges
tion, holding that a prospective injunction was unnecessary because "Massachuset~ de
clares that she intends to and must obey these findings of the War Department. Her
statements. . . clearly negative any threat, intention or purpose to make any diversion of
water in excess of that spec!fted . . . . " Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 674
(emphasis added).
149. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
150. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
151. Id at 338-39, 343-45. The injuries alleged were to fisheries, water quality,
industry, property values, water supply, agriculture, and recreation. Id Pennsylvania
had intervened, not in direct opposition to the New York plan, but to request that the
diversion be charged against New York's equitable share of the Delaware River's dow.
Id at 340-41.
152. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
153. 283 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
154. Id at 345.
155. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931) (decree).
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New York, on the volume of permissible diversions. 156 Although the
master found that the diversion did not seriously threaten the water
quality in the main stem of the Delaware River,157 the decree also
obligated New York, before it could effect the diversion, to construct
a sewage treatment plant to purify wastes entering the river at Port
Jervis, New York.15s In line with the decree entered in Connecticut v.
Massachusells,159 New York also was required to release a limited
volume of the impounded waters during periods of low flow in the
main stem. 160
Washington v. Oregon,161 decided in 1936, was perhaps the most

easily resolved of the interstate water diversion cases. Washington
alleged that Oregon irrigators were appropriating an excessive vol
ume of water from a branch of the Walla Walla River and requested
a decree of equitable apportionment. 162 Based largely on the
master's findings, Justice Cardozo dismissed the claim on several
grounds. 163
Justice Cardozo found elements of laches in the conduct of
Washington and of the key Washington consumer, Gardena Farms,
who had permitted the Oregon diversions to go unchallenged for al
most fifty years. 164 He also found that the Washington appropriator
156. The limit, 440 mgd, was considerably less than New York's planned diversion
volume of 600 mgd. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 339-40.
157. Id at 345.
158. Id at 346.
159. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
160. 283 U.S. at 346-47. The decree was made subject to the paramount interest of
the United States in protecting the navigability of the Delaware River. Id at 348. The
decree was modified in 1954, with the consent of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey, to permit New York to increase the volume of its diversions on completion of a
new dam. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954). The use of the Delaware River
as a water supply is now governed by the Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No.
87-328,75 Stat. 688 (1961).
161. 297 U.S. 517 (1936). Washinglon v. Oregon is discussed in Kelly, Ralioning Ihe
Rivers: A Decade o/Inlerslale Walers and Inlerslale Commerce in Ihe Supreme Court, 14
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 12 (1941).
162. 297 U.S. at 518-19. The Walla Walla actually divides into several branches in
northeastern Oregon. Oregon farmers had been in the practice of diverting most of the
water from the largest branch into the smaller ones, from which irrigation channels had
been dug. Id at 519-22. Washington also had alleged that the Oregon farmers were
improperly taking and applying the region's groundwater. Those allegations were re
jected on several grounds. Id at 524-26.
163. Id at 530.
164. Id at 529-30. Justice Cardozo offered a stinging rebuke to Washington in the
course of his opinion.
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undertook its irrigation project knowing of the preexisting Oregon
diversions 165 and had failed to complete its project diligently.166
Based on those findings, relevant to both considerations of equity
and of appropriation law, Justice Cardozo held that the Oregon irri
gators were not taking more than their rightful share of the Walla
Walla River's flOW. 167
In 1945, Nebraska v. Wyoming,168 the most recent and most
complex interstate diversion case was decided. Justice Douglas,
writing for five members of the Court,169 adjudicated the rights of
three competing states to the waters of the North Platte River. The
North Platte originates in Colorado and flows through Wyoming
and Nebraska before entering the Missouri River. The North Platte
had long been subject to extensive diversions for the purpose of irriThe case comes down to this: the court is asked upon uncertain evidence
of prior right and still more uncertain evidence of damage to destroy possessory
interests enjoyed without challenge for over half a century. In such circum
stances an injunction would not issue if the contest were between private par
ties, at odds about a boundary. Still less will it issue here in a contest between
states, a contest to be dealt with in the large and ample way that alone becomes
the dignity of the litigants concerned.
Id at 529.
165. Id at 527.
166. Id at 528-29.
167. Id at 526-27. 1ustice Cardozo gave great weight to the principles of priority
of appropriation in his decision. That same concept was central to the decision in Wyo
ming v. Colorado, though in both cases the Court emphasized that considerations of eq
uity dictated a similar result. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
Washington v. Oregon was also grounded on a very practical finding. Because of the
porous qualities of the Walla Walla riverbed, even were the Oregon diversions to be
enjoined, little or none of the water flowing past the site of those diversions would reach
Washington during the dry season. 1ustice Cardozo observed:
To restrain the diversion . . . would bring distress and even ruin to a long es
tablished settlement of tillers of the soil for no other or better purpose than to
vindicate a barren right. This is not the high equity that moves the conscience
of the court in giving judgment between the states.
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 523 (citations omitted).
168. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) in which
the Court confirmed the paramount authority of Congress to allocate the water of a navi
gable interstate river (the Colorado) under its Article I power to regulate interstate com
merce. Although the Arizona v. CalifOrnia Court considered the proper allocation of
water from certain Colorado River tributaries, its decision was based on statutory con
struction, not principles of equitable apportionment:
169. 1ustice 1ackson took no part in the decision. 1ustice Roberts, joined by 1us
tices Rutledge and Frankfurter, dissented on the grounds that the case was not properly
justiciable, as Nebraska had not carried its burden of proof. 325 U.S. at 657-64 (Roberts,
1., dissenting).

666

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:641

gating arid lands and was impounded behind a series of dams in
Wyoming and Nebraska to maximize a reliable water supply.170
The controversy arose in part because of the construction of another
dam in Wyoming, the Kendrick Project,171 and in part because of
the effects of a series of droughts beginning in 1930 and persisting for
some thirteen years. 172 Nebraska alleged that the new dam
threatened the future water supply to western Nebraska, and that the
drought, in concert with upstream diversions, had caused an insuf
ficient flow of water to even satisfy Nebraska's then existing needs. 173
Justice Douglas, adopted the master's findings, and by denying
Colorado's motion to dismiss, held that the North Platte River had
been over-appropriated by Colorado and Wyoming and that a justi
ciable controversy existed. 174 Justice Douglas applied the locally
adopted principles of priority of appropriation as a general guide,
but stated:
[I]f an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be pos
sible. For example, the economy of a region may have been estab
lished on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible
those established uses should be protected though strict applica
tion of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment
callsfor the exercise ofan informedjudgment on a consideration of
manyfactors .175

Justice Douglas divided the river into six segments. 176 Based on
170. Id at 594-97.
171. The dam was constructed by the federal government, and had not been put
into operation before Nebraska v. Wyoming was decided. Id at 597.
172. Id at 598-99.
173. Id at 599.
174. Id at 608-11. Justice Douglas found that all three states were governed by
appropriation law, although eastern sections of Nebraska follow principles of riparian
ism. Id at 599-600.
175. Id at 618. (emphasis added). Justice Douglas continued:
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and cliinatic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the
character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability
of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former-these are all re!evant factors. They are
merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of
the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which
must be made.
Id
176. Id at 593. One segment was in Colorado, three in Wyoming, and two in
Nebraska. The two Nebraska segments were essentially ignored because the critical
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a balancing of priority rights, practical considerations, and equities,
appropriators in four of the segments were granted rights to ~ share
of the dependable flow of the river.177 Domestic uses in all three
states were exempted from any of these limitations.l78 Rights to the
water in the most fiercely contested segment of the river were allo
cated between Wyoming and Nebraska on a percentage formula de
rived from appropriation volumes during periods of high river
flow.l7 9 Such a determination was alien to the actual priorities that
were recognized in that region 180 but was seen by Justice Douglas as
the most sensible and equitable basis for allocating rights, particu
larly during periods of drought when reliance on the river would be
at its height.181
Justice Douglas' opinion drew substantially upon the soundest
elements of the Court's analysis of prior interstate water diversion
controversies. The decision in Nebraska v. Wyomingl82 accorded
considerable weight to state law governing water rights to the source
in dispute, but state law clearly was made secondary to the principles
of equitable apportionment. 183
Equitable apportionment was explicitly recognized as the prod
uct of a balancing of three factors beyond the consideration of rights
vested under state law. One of the factors was the practical consider
ation of avoiding regulation of an upstream use when that regulation
would create no downstream benefits. 184 A second factor was the
consideration, common to equity, of the reliance interests of those
who had become dependent on established diversions. 18s A third
factor accorded substantial weight was the character of various uses;
reach of the North Platte was the easternmost segment in Wyoming. It was from that
segment that virtually all of the Nebraska appropriators who depended on the North
Platte drew their water. Id at 595-96, 654-55.
177. Id at 621-55. Colorado users were, for instance, limited to their present levels
of consumption. Id at 621-23. See note 176 supra for treatment accorded the two most
downstream segments.
178. 325 U.S. at 656.
179. Id at 637-43.
180. Id at 641 (table listing priorities).
181. Id at 643. There were also considerations of efficiency and economic fairness
supporting this determination. Id at 640.
182. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
183. Id at 618, 646. This holding, together with Justice Douglas' interpretation of
Washington v. Oregon and Wyoming v. Colorado, brought the western appropriation
cases more in line with the decisions in New Jersey v. New York and Connecticut v. Mas
sachusetts, which had rejected application of strict riparian principles.
184. 325 U.S. at 619.
185. Id at 618, 621, 643.
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whether wasteful or efficient, whether domestic or agricultural. 186
Clearly, Justice Douglas intended that all the relevant burdens cre
ated by a diversion from an interstate stream be considered and
weighed against a similar consideration of the diversion's benefits.
That analysis should apply to future litigation as well. Those factors
explored by Justice Douglas, as well as several other contemporary
factors, would be central to the development of evidence and argu
ments to be presented should Connecticut seek an injunction to bar
the proposed diversion at Northfield.
IV.

ISSUES IN A POSSIBLE INTERSTATE LAWSUIT OVER THE
NORTHFIELD DIVERSION

The rule established in the interstate water diversion cases is
that a state opposing diversion of water must allege substantial in
jury to sustain a suit 187 and must prove that injury by clear and con
vincing evidence in order to obtain an injunction. 188 Further, a state
bringing suit must confront two unattractive options in the timing of
its objections. A state may seek an injunction before a diversion is
accomplished, shouldering the burden of demonstrating injury based
only on projections of impact. 189 Alternatively, it may allow the di
version to occur and collect hard evidence of impact, then shoulder
ing the burden of opposing an established use. l90
The Supreme Court has embraced several principles that may
mitigate a complaining state's burdens in certain factual settings.
The Court has considered the totality of downstream impacts im
posed by a diversion: Thus, where no single injury was of sufficient
magnitude, several lesser injuries, when considered together, were
found substantial enough to justify at least a partial injunction. 191
Similarly, a state has not been permitted to accomplish through a
series of minor diversions, each with minimal impacts, that which
would not have been permissible to accomplish through a single,
major diversion. 192
The Supreme Court also has accorded weight to the nature of
186. Id. at 618, 656.
187. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 669.
188. Id. at 669.
189. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
190. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); see also note 127 supra.
191. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345; see notes 154-58 supra
and accompanying text.
192. While this rule has never been explicitly stated, it is implicit in several of the
interstate water diversion cases, in which the cumulative downstream impact of all of a
state's diversions were considered. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
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water use in the contending states, thereby establishing a rough hier
archy of values for differing uses. 193 Consumptive use has been val
ued over nonconsumptive. l94 Domestic consumption has been
valued over agricultural consumption. 195 Efficient use has been val
ued over inefficient use. 196 Thus, should a downstream state success
fully demonstrate its use would be more valuable than the diverting
state's use, the downstream state's chances of obtaining an injunction
would be greatly enhanced.l 97 By the same logic, if a diversion were
wasteful, or were effected to supplement a wasteful use, there would
be a good possibility that the diversion would be enjoined.
Finally, the Court has applied the principles of use hierarchy
and the consideration of overall downstream impact in a more gen
eralized balancing of the burdens and benefits occasioned by a water
diversion.l 98 In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,199 for example, in ad~
dition to surveying all the injuries Connecticut alleged, Justice Butler
examined Boston's need for drinking water, the paramount value of
that use, and the lack of viable alternatives to the proposed construc
tion of Quabbin.2°O Justice Butler's decision favorable to Massachu
setts was premised not merely on Connecticut's failure to prove
substantial injury: Consistent with the general concept of equitable
allocation, his implicit finding was that the benefits of the diversion
outweighed its burdens. 201
As has been shown, however, in controversies in which the bal
ance of burdens and benefits has been reversed, diversions have been
enjoined.202 Should the Northfield diversion plan near fruition, and
(1931) (considering the overall impacts of several planned diversions by the State of New
York).
193. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673; see notes 144, 178,
186 supra and accompanying text.
.
194. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); see notes 102-05 supra and
accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); see note 174 supra and
accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); see notes 107-10 supra and
accompanying text.
197. This rule is implicit in Wisconsin v. Dlinois, 248 U.S. 367 (1929); see note 127
supra. On the other hand, where similar uses of water are made in the contending states,
the Court has not required that each use be equally productive. Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. at 468-69.
198. See notes 94-97, 144, 154-60, 175 supra and accompanying text.
199. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
200. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
201. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673.
202. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Dlinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); see note 127 supra; see
also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); note 177 supra.
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should Connecticut seek to enjoin the diversion, the principles of
overall downstream impact, hierarchy of uses, and burden-benefit
analysis likely would be central to the Supreme Court's analysis of
the controversy. Those principles therefore provide the framework
for discussion of the positive and negative attributes of the North
field diversion. Because detailed, reliable evidence is unavailable,
discussion will be general. Not coincidentally, the Supreme Court
has adopted a similarly general approach. In adjudicating interstate
water suits, the Court has looked to the overall tenor of the evidence
and arguments presented:
It is difficult for a court to decide issues of fact upon which experts

equal in number and standing differ flatly and when their conclu
sions rest on estimates upon the correctness of which the court,
without technical knowledge, can not undertake to pass. In such
cases, the court looks about for outstandingfactsfrom which the lay
mind can safely draw inferences . . . .203

A. Possible Downstream Impacts of the Northfield Diversion

The Swift River diversion that created Quabbin subtracts ap
proximately two percent from the average flow of the Connecticut
River.204 That fact was noted by the Supreme Court, whose ap
proval of Quabbin was at least partially predicated on Massachu
setts' declaration that it would adhere to the provisions of a project
permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. That permit re
quired Massachusetts to release water from Quabbin during periods
of low river flow, thereby protecting the navigability and water qual
ity of the lower Connecticut River.20S Significantly, the Court re
frained from enjoining any future diversions in part because
Massachusetts' "statements . . . clearly negative any threat, inten
tion or purpose to make any diversion in excess of that specified or
otherwise than as set forth in the determinations of the War
Department."206
The Northfield diversion would subtract an additional one per
cent from the river's annual flOW. 207 The combined effect of the es
tablished and proposed diversions would result in a cumulative
downstream flow reduction of approximately three percent. Thus,
203. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 385-86 (1923) (emphasis added).
204. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 666.
205. Id at 665.
206. Id at 674.
207. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 58.
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the Northfield diversion, if accomplished, apparently would violate
the Supreme Court's 1931 decree by materially increasing the vol
ume of diversion. 208 Although the Court likely would find a suit
premised solely on that contention to be without merit,209 that Con
necticut opposed the creation of Quabbin could provide an impor
tant foundation for Connecticut's claim in any litigation to block the
proposed diversion. Certainly, Connecticut has not slept on its equi
table rights2IO and thus should be permitted to adduce evidence of
the cumulative impacts on Connecticut's interests of both past and
impending diversions. 211
Preservation of the navigability of the Connecticut River is of
substantial interest to Connecticut, particularly along the reach of
the river below the fallline. 212 As one illustration of that interest,
several oil storage facilities south of Hartford are supplied chiefly by
tankers that navigate the river for a distance greater than thirty
miles. Any impairment to the navigability of the river could have
two effects: Restriction of tanker access to the terminals and en
hancement of the risks of collision and grounding. Correspondingly,
those risks could enhance the danger of an oil spill in the river.
There is other commercial use of the river for transportation in
the reach south of Hartford, but available evidence suggests that the
Massachusetts diversions, present and proposed, would create their
most significant impacts during the spring, when river level is high
and channel depth is not a major concem. 213 Should Connecticut,
however, be able to demonstrate that risks are created, however, that
proof would be significant, for impairmen~ of navigability has been a
pivotal issue in several of the interstate diversion cases.214
When Connecticut brought suit against the Swift River diver
sion in 1931, there was a hydroelectric power station on the Connect
icut River, north of Hartford. 2ls Although the Supreme Court
208. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
209. Were Connecticut to advocate an injunction based solely on the somewhat
obscure language of the 1931 decree, the Court might find that advocacy to be merely an
exercise ''to vindicate a barren right." Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 53.
210. For the importance oflaches in interstate water cases, see note 164supra and
accompanying text.
211. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
212. The fall line of the Connecticut River is at Windsor Locks, Connecticut. See
map, Appendix B.
213. A similar discussion can be found in Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
at 666.
214. Id.; see note 127 supra.
215. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 667.
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denied an injunction, the possible impact of a diversion upon the
facility was accorded consideration. 216 That facility no longer is in
operation, but a smaller hydroelectric power station presently oper
ates on the same reach of the river, at Windsor Locks. 217 Two mu
nicipal electric cooperatives218 are undertaking an expansion of that
power station;219 when completed, the project would require an
available river tlow of 1900 cfs.220 But because the present average
tlow of the Connecticut River, as it enters Connecticut, is 15,900
CfS,221 it is unlikely that an upstream diversion of the magnitude au
thorized at Northfield would have any perceptible impact on the ex
panded Windsor Locks hydroelectric power plant. 222
At the present time, only industrial consumers in Connecticut
use the river as a water supply.223 Because those users are few and
because the cumulative tlow restriction caused by both present and
planned diversions would be slight, no discernible impact will be im
posed on these current industrial users. Although several studies in
dicate that Connecticut communities will become dependent on the
river as a municipal water source in the future,224 Connecticut would
be unable to forcefully argue for protection of this substantial inter
est. Even in the aftermath of the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act,225 the Supreme Court has held that protection of such indefinite
future rights is beyond the proper scope of its adjudicatory power in
interstate water diversion suits.226
Connecticut has a more immediate interest in protecting the
volume and quality of Connecticut River water, as those measures
affect the river's ecological balance, recreational opportunities, and
216. Id
217. STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF POLlCY AND MANAGEMENT, ENERGY:
HYDROPOWER POLlCY AND REPORT (1981).
218. Massachusetts Municipal Electric Energy Co-operative and Connecticut
Wholesale Electric Co-operative.
219. Letter from J. Home, State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management,
to Charles Stephenson (Sept. 28, 1981).
220. Id
221. BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63, at D-2.
222. Economic injury to commerce, and indirectly to consumers, was accorded
substantial weight in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 408-09 (1929).
223. The most significant industrial consumer is the Connecticut Yankee nuclear
power facility in Haddam, which draws water from the river to cool its reactor core.
224. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. See generally BASIN COMM. COM
PREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63.
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
226. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 608; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U.S. at 674. This premise is perhaps open to dispute. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20
§ 130.2; notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
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capacity to accept sewage and organic pollution. Under the doctrine
of parens patriae ,227 Connecticut has a legal interest in protecting
plant and animal life in the river, riverbed, and tloodplain. 228 Sev
eral threatened and endangered species have been identified in the
Connecticut River basin,229 and should Connecticut demonstrate
that those species' welfare and survival would be placed at risk by
the proposed diversion, the Supreme Court might accord that evi
dence considerable weight.230
In the past, the Supreme Court's analysis of interstate water di
version cases has been devoid of ecological considerations. The
cases, however, were all decided before 1946 and, in the present era,
the vulnerability of life forms and of the food chain to human inter
ference may be more effectively raised before a court than in the
past. In addition, the nation is now statutorily committed to protect
ing all forms of life and preserving ecological balance. 231 As with
any modem technology, water diversions can disrupt the lives of
both primitive and complex organisms. The intensity and breadth of
any such disruptions, if demonstrable by objective evidence, could
become a focal issue in a suit to block the Northfield diversion, be
cause of heightened awareness of ecological impacts.
Any substantial decrease in water quality could also reduce the
recreational value of the Connecticut River. Connecticut currently
227. The doctrine ofparens patriae permits Connecticut to bring suit in its role as
trustee of the natural resources of the state. See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court, II STAN. L. REv. 665 (1959).
228. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled on other grounds, Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
229. The following is a list of threatened or endangered species indigenous to the
Connecticut River basin: (I) Alasmidonta heterodon (mussel); (2) Goniohasis virginica
(slug); (3) Crangonyx pseudogracilis (flea); (4) ACipenser hrevirostrum (sturgeon);
(5) Acipenser oxyrhychus (sturgeon); (6) Falco peregrinus (falcon); (7) Haliaetus
leucocephalus (bald eagle); (8) Ludwigia polycarpa (water herb); (9) Pandion haliaetus
(osprey); (10) Salix interior (willow); and (II) Sagittaria cuneata (arrowhead plant). M.
DeFalco, supra note 8, at 13; D. Smith, supra TABLE I, note e.
Projects that require licensing or sponsorship by any branch of the federal govern
ment implicate the prohibitions of the Endangered Species Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-42 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For one illustration of the importance of the Endan
gered Species Conservation Act, see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(blocking completion of the Tellico Dam because of the dam's projected impact on the
snail darter).
230. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345 (according weight to a diver
sion's impact on oysters, though regarding oysters purely as a commercial resource); see
also note 229 supra.
231. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976 & Supp. V
1981); see note 229 supra.
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maintains seven parks on the banks of the river232 and stocks scores
of Connecticut River tributaries with several species of sport fish.233
Additionally, the river supports a large recreational boating fleet,
and Connecticut maintains five major launching facilities along the
main stem. 234 While recreational uses have been accorded weight in
only one of the prior interstate cases,23S the multiple use potential of
water sources is an important concern today. Any provable impact
on Connecticut's recreational uses of the river caused by the North
field diversion might therefore be given substantial consideration by
the Supreme Court.
Connecticut joins the three upstream states236 in making sub
stantial use of the Connecticut River as a waste disposal reposi
tory.237 One dramatic effect of any decrease in river volume is the
river's correspondingly reduced capacity to safely accept those
wastes. 238 Adequate volume is necessary to maintain water quality
by keeping oxygen levels high, waste precipitation low, and waste
concentrations within acceptable limitS.239 Should water quality be
come inadequate, then legal as well as aesthetic considerations may
preclude the continuation of Connecticut's present waste disposal
practices. 240 The Northfield diversion, by reducing river flow, would
have a measurable impact on this waste disposal-water quality equa
tion. Any demonstrable reduction in the river's capacity to accept
wastes would have an immediate effect on the interests of Connecti
cut citizens and could therefore provide Connecticut with a substan
tiallegal argument against the Northfield diversion.
In 1931, Connecticut argued that the Swift River diversion
would diminish the Connecticut River shad run. 241 The Supreme
232. The seven parks are: Dart Island, Waldo, Gillette Castle, Haddam Island,
Haddam Meadows, Hurd, and Selden Neck State Parks. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEP'T
OF TRANSP., OFFICIAL 1981-1982 TRANSPORTATION/REcREATION MAP (1981).
233. See STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC
TION, CONNECTICUT FISHERIES PAMPHLET No.4: 1979-1980 CONNECTICUT TROUT
STOCKING REpORT.
234. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICIAL 1891-1982 TRANSPOR
TATION/REcREATION MAP (1981).
235. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345.
236.. New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts. See note 2 supra.
237. See generally BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63.
238. See TABLE I supra, notes a, i-k.

239. Id
240. Both state and federal law may limit discharge of sewage, even when treated,
into an overburdened body of water. See e.g. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1361 (1976 & Supp. V
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-26 (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-54 a-yy (1981).
241. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 664. The shad, like the salmon, is
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Court found that the proof offered to substantiate that allegation was
insufficient.242 Largely because of increased pollution and river
da mmi ng,243 and perhaps also because of the diversion, a decrease in
the shad run did occur during the early decades of the twentieth cen
tury. Recently, through the combined efforts of federal and state
governments and private industry,244 the shad run has stabilized, and
the shad fishery remains a commercially viable activity in the Con
necticut River estuary.
The Northfield diversion could substantially injure the shad
run, indirectly, by increasing pollution concentrations. The North
field diversion could also impede the shad run in two, more direct,
ways. Periodic intensive diversion of water could cause disruption of
the operation of the fish ladders necessary to the shad's upstream
migration. 24s Also, as suggested in one study, the diversion could
create so much turbulence in the Northfield reach of the Connecticut
River that the shad's sensory faculties might be distorted, causing
many fish to become disoriented.246 Either of these effects could
cause a reduction in the reproductive rate of the shad, with a resul
tant impact on Connecticut's commercial shad fishery.247 In at least
one interstate water suit, the Supreme Court considered such an in
quiry to be of substantial relevance.248

an anadramous fish, living most of its life in the ocean, but which ascends fresh water
streams to spawn.
242. Id at 667.
243. The shad and salmon are unable to leap over either the Holyoke or Turners
Falls dams on the Connecticut River, and cannot pass the dams without the aid of a fish
ladder.
244. See generally Anadramous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 757 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). One important participant in the Connecticut River Anadramous Fish
program is Northeast Utilities, owner of the Northfield facility. N.U. has constructed fish
ladders at both its Holyoke and Turners Falls facilities.
245. A fish ladder is composed of a series of "stairs" over which a migrating fish
may comfortably leap. Such a ladder is necessary at dams that exceed a certain height to
permit fish to move upstream past the dam. In an effectively designed ladder, water is
directed through a sluiceway in the dam at a rate that would roughly correspond to the
natural rate of Bow over rapids with a length/drop ratio comparable to that of the ladder.
Fluctuations in the depth of the impounded water could affect that rate of Bow, with a
consequent impact on the success of the annual shad/salmon migration.
246. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38.
247. Seeid
248. Injury to the oyster fishery in the Delaware River was one reason why the
Supreme Court limited the volume of New York's diversion in New Jersey v. New York,
283 U.S. at 345.
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B. Hierarchy of Uses for Connecticut River Water
It has been shown that Connecticut makes no present use of the
Connecticut River for purposes of domestic water consumption, and
little use of the river for industrial purposes. Connecticut uses the
river primarily for recreation, navigation, and waste disposal. By
contrast, the Northfield diversion would help satisfy the domestic,
municipal,249 and industrial water supply needs of greater Boston. 250
Superficially, then, the MOC's plan to divert and consume Connecti
cut River water appears to be a more beneficial and more favored
use. 2S1
But underlying greater Boston's need for more consumable
water are statistics that could prove to be the basis for compelling
arguments against the Northfield diversion. A 1975 study in thirteen
test communities of the MOC system252 found that an average of
over 85,000 gallons of water per mile of pipe leaked from the distri
bution network each day.253 The study found that in Boston alone
approximately fifty million gallons were lost daily due to leaks and
pipe ruptures. 254 Another study, including the years through 1978,
indicated that much of Boston's distribution system has not been re
placed since 1890 and that in some instances, water pipes are totally
decayed. 25s The MOC study estimated that up to seventy-six million
gallons of daily loss could be remedied by a system-wide repair pro
249. Municipal uses of MOC water include firefighting, water supplies to schools
and other municipal buildings, system flushing, and street cleaning. See KAYNOR,
WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at A3.
250. The population of the MOC member communities was estimated to be ap
proximately 2.3 million in 1980. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7.
251. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618,656.
252. The study, popularly called the Curran Report, was funded by the MOC and
executed by the Water Resources Research Center at the University of Massachusetts
and Curran Assoc:ates of Northampton, Massachusetts. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION
STUDY, supra note 41, at 56.
253. MASSACHUSETTS PuBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, BOSTON IS LEAKING 2
(1981) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massa
chusetts) [hereinafter cited as MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT). The estimates and projec
tions of system leakage that were made in the Curran Report have been defended as
statistically conservative. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at AI
A4.
254. MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT, supra note 253, at 2-3. This figure is arrived at
by multiplying the estimated daily consumption in Boston (143 mgd) by the percentage
of that water estimated to be unmetered (46 percent). The product is then multiplied by
the estimated percentage of unmetered water that is not beneficially consumed (76
percent).
255. Moynihan, An Examination of Urban Water Supply Systems: A Case Study of
the Boston, Massachusetts Metropolitan Area, I J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 86, 87 (1979).
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gram. 256 This level of waste probably has been reduced somewhat
because most MOC member communities, with state aid, are under
taking repair programs and are educating consumers on the benefits
of conservation. One such program has resulted in a net savings of
twenty-nine percent in per capita water consumption. 257 Nonethe
less, waste likely remains substantial.
The Supreme Court, in several contexts, has held that waste and
inefficiency are important considerations in the proper allocation of
water rights among the states. 258 Waste on the scale revealed in the
MOC distribution system indicates that available water supplies are
not being put to their most beneficial use. The potential for savings
to be realized through consumer conservation carries a similar impli
cation. Because the 1975 estimates of correctable daily losses ex
ceeds the MOC's projection of yield from the Northfield
diversion,259 more recent evidence of continued inefficiencies in the
MOC distribution system would be central to any interstate litiga
tion. That evidence would undermine any contention that Connecti
cut River water would be put to its highest and best use through
diversion and would also provide compelling proof of waste.
C.

Comparison oj' Benefits and Burdens Resultingfrom the
Northfield Diversion

Partly because of their wastefulness in the use of available water
supplies, the MOC member communities will soon need additional
water. Several studies indicate that the MOC is already delivering
more water than the safe yield260 of its sources,261 and that MOC
members' demand for water is almost certain to increase. 262 Popula
256. MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT, supra note 253, at 2. The town of Arlington's
per capita consumption dropped from 138 gallons per day in 1971 to 98 gallons per day
in 1978, resulting in a town-wide savings in excess of $145,000 per year. Id
257. Id
258. See notes 106, 121, 186 supra and accompanying text.
259. The MDC projects an average daily yield from Northfield of 72 mgd. See
notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
260. Safe yield is defined in many ways, but essentially, the term means the avail
able volume of water that a source can provide during all but the most extreme periods of
drought. See !(AYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 50-52.
261. See e.g. SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
262. See, e.g., Wallace, Floyd Associates, Inc., Planning Area (Sept. 1982) (draft
report) (available at Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee, Hadley, Massachu
setts); WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON
WATER SUPPLY, CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WATER
QUALITY TASK FORCE).
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tion in the MOC service area is presently 2.3 million. 263 That figure
will grow, not simply as the result of population growth in member
communities, but also because of additions to the MOC roster of
water service communities. 264 Eastern Massachusetts' groundwater
has become increasingly contaminated, particularly by road salt and
the organic compound TCE,265 an industrial solvent. The MOC sys
tem will likely absorb in the future, as it has in the past, area com
munities whose municipal groundwater sources become unusable. 266
The Northfield diversion would then clearly benefit the MOC and its
member communities by helping to satisfy expanding future
demand.
Should Connecticut seek to enjoin the diversion, the Supreme
Court would accord considerable weight to projections of need for
augmented water supply.267 But Connecticut, as it did in 1931,
would likely argue that Boston's need for water should not automati
cally translate into the need for Connecticut River water. 268 At least
one other viable source of supply for the MOe has been studied
extensively: the Plymouth groundwater aquifer in southeastern
Massachusetts. 269 Though initially more costly, sinking wells into
the Plymouth aquifer probably would yield a more reliable and
purer water source than would the Connecticut River diversion. 270
263. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7.
264. There are several towns within fifteen miles of the State House in Boston that
are not presently members of the MDC but that could become members without amend
ing the water supply statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 92, § 10 (West 1969 & Cum.
Supp. 1982-83). Several non-member towns in central Massachusetts also receive MDC
water and that number could also conceivably increase as well.
265: TCE is trichloroethylene. A 1979 study found significant TCE contamination
in the water supply of several communities located within fifteen miles of the State
House. The towns are: Bedford, Burlington, Canton, Danvers, Dedham, North Read
ing, Norwood, Westwood, Wilmington, and Woburn. WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE,
supra note 262.
266. Bedford, Dedham, and Westwood are expected to join the MDC because of
local supply contamination. Canton, Norwood, and Woburn have all become increas
ingly dependent on the MDC as local supplies have become unusable. Id
267. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 664-65, 674.
268. Id at 664.
269. The Plymouth aquifer is a massive groundwater source containing water
trapped in water-bearing gravel that overlays a layer of impermiable rock. Williams,
Boston Water, supra note 43, at 10.
270. The Corps of Engineers has speculated that the Plymouth aquifer could safely
yield 300 mgd of pure water. Id There have been several other alternatives suggested,
including siphoning water from the Merrimack and Sudbury Rivers. Though both flow
through eastern Massachusetts, they are contaminated with large amounts of industrial
chemicals and polluted by upstream sewage discharge; neither is a promising water
source. It has also been suggested that Quabbin Reservoir could itself be made more
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Other factors derogating from the Northfield diversion's bene
fits to Boston area communities are the possible impacts of introduc
ing Connecticut River water into the MOC system. Those impacts
likely would include reducing the quality of Quabbin water, disrup
tion of Quabbin ecology, and the consequent degradation of the
quality of the water distributed for use through the MOC system. 271
While not injurious to Connecticut, those impacts would be nonethe
less relevant to any assessment of the benefits to be derived from the
proposed diversion.
Greater Boston's need for augmented water supply, though not
insubstantial, stands as the only clear benefit the Northfield diver
sion could provide. As noted, the quality ofthat benefit has not gone
unchallenged even in recipient communities,272 and the same benefit
might be achieved by tapping alternative sources or curbing
waste. 273 It has also been shown that against the benefit of reducing
the MOC's supply crisis is a substantial list of possible downstream
injuries. 274
But while the MOC's needs are fairly clear, no accurate projec
tions have been yet drawn of the Northfield diversion's likely impact
on Connecticut River water quality, ecology, navigation, hydroelec
tric power generation, waste disposal, recreation, and commercial
fisheries. The MOC's Environmental Impact Report may provide
accurate projections, though its primary focus will be on impacts
within Massachusetts. Connecticut, of course, might undertake its
own impact studies.
Because the volume of diversion, past and proposed, represents
only a small fraction of Connecticut River flow, any downstream im
pacts would likely be subtle. Additionally, most of the issues likely
to be raised in litigation to block the Northfield diversion would be
subtle, at least in comparison to those raised by the titanic diversions
and dry riverbeds at issue in many of the prior Supreme Court cases.
Yet should Connecticut present reliable proof of MOC system waste,
feasible supply alternatives and a broad range of injuries, however
minor, the overall weight of evidence, when measured against the
productive through judicious tree harvesting in its watershed, which would increase rain
water runoff into the reservoir.
271. See TABLE III supra, notes o-q. All MOe sources eventually commingle in
the distribution system.
272. See notes 252-66 supra and accompanying text.
273. See TABLES I-III supra; notes 204-48 supra and accompanying text.
274. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342.
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dubiop-s benefits of the Northfield diversion, should justify an
injunction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The controversy over the Northfield diversion may never be
presented for resolution by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Massachusetts' Environmental Impact Report may prove the North
field diversion to be practically and politically infeasible. Connecti
cut's misgivings may be quieted by a reciprocal agreement, either
informally or through a compact approved by Congress. Should in
terstate litigation ensue, however, evidence would likely be devel
oped, and arguments presented, within the framework described
here.
In such a suit, Connecticut would carry the heavy burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, substantial injury to its
interests. The weight of that burden would be lessened to the extent
that Connecticut could demonstrate that the Northfield diversion is
unnecessary or that better alternatives exist. Connecticut should also
be permitted to demonstrate that the cumulative impact of the ex
isting and impending diversions would injure one or more of Con
necticut's interests in the Connecticut River. The crucial elements in
the presentation of Connecticut's case would be evidence of MDC
system-wide waste, other available water sources, and downstream
impacts on navigation, water quality, ecosystems, and commercial
interests. Thorough development of this evidence would no doubt
prove costly, but, if accomplished, persuasive.
Regardless of its outcome, the Northfield diversion controversy
carries substantial national implications. Potable water is becoming
an increasingly scarce and valuable resource, and its allocation to
one use, accomplished by modem technology, frequently makes it
unavailable for other uses. That circumstance is particularly clear
when water is permanently transferred out of its natural basin.
Many areas, including metropolitan Boston, having insufficient sup
plies of water to meet future demand. Unless these water deficient
areas obtain new sources of supply or begin to practice effective con
servation of water resources, population and economic growth will
decline and could reverse. As available water supplies continue to
dwindle, the Supreme Court will likely be thrust into a more active
role in the interstate allocation of water. It is hoped that the Court
will perceive that its decisions must not merely effect a fair distribu
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tion of water among competing states, but also affirmatively protect
water sources from overuse and further degradation.
According to geologists, the Connecticut River flowed without
human interference for millenia, shaping the geography and ecology
of much of New England. The river has had a similar impact on life
in New England since the first European settlements: Providing
water, power, food, and an avenue of transportation for a developing
culture. In such a light, Justice Holmes observed fifty years ago: "A
river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure." If the Connecticut,
already badly tarnished, is to remain such a treasure, future develop
ment must be undertaken only with great caution.
In the past, technological development has exacted a repeated
and heavy toll on the vitality of the river. The implications of the
Northfield diversion must be viewed from that perspective. The di
version embodies many of the marvels of modem engineering and is
intended to subtract only a small percentage from the flow of a
mighty river. So too, it is designed to help satisfy a readily measura
ble need for water. By contrast, the nature and extent of the project's
possible downstream impacts are matters of speculation, difficult to
predict and likely to be felt only in the future. But impacts there will
be, and with those impacts will come further degradation of the Con
necticut River. Any principled resolution of the Northfield contro
versy must guard against such an outcome, husbanding the
Connecticut River for the future, not simply partitioning its waters to
satisfy present perceptions of need.
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